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A Chechen al-Qaeda? 
Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle 
Guido Steinberg 
In April 2014 government forces defeated a rebel offensive in the north of the Syrian 
province of Latakia. Although they initially reached the coast, the insurgents were un-
able to hold their positions there. The rebel forces included many Chechens and other 
Caucasians, who had previously been seen fighting exclusively in the Caucasus. Their 
strong presence in Syria is a completely new turn in international jihadism, and a warn-
ing to be taken seriously, as many arrive from the Georgian, Turkish and European 
diasporas rather than from their original home republics. While their goal remains to 
“liberate” the Caucasus from Russian rule, they are now struggling to topple the regime 
of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and there is a risk that they will continue terrorist activity 
after returning to Turkey and Europe. The arrival of the Chechens in Syria makes a joint 
anti-terrorism strategy with Turkey even more urgent, and forces Western states to 
cooperate with Russian security agencies. 
 
The issue of Chechens fighting in jihadist 
movements has been debated for years. 
While “Chechens” fighting with the Taliban 
or the Afghan insurgency have featured 
since the 1990s in the academic literature, 
media and public discussion, convincing 
evidence for these claims has never been 
provided. Russian citizens from the Cau-
casus have occasionally been detained or 
killed out of area, but these were never 
ethnic Chechens. Instead it appears that 
observers frequently confused Caucasians 
with Central Asians, especially Uzbeks, 
who have at times been present in large 
numbers in Afghanistan and Pakistan and 
also speak Russian. Until recently, Che-
chens and other Caucasians have fought 
almost exclusively to liberate their own 
region from Russian rule. 
That has changed in the past two years. 
Syria in 2014 has at least four different 
insurgent formations led by Chechens and 
composed of Caucasians and other foreign 
fighters. All belong to the jihadist side of 
the spectrum and together might account 
for up to 1,500 fighters. The civil war in 
Syria therefore stands out as a reorientation 
of the hitherto strongly nationalist jihadism 
of the Caucasians, and its increasing 
integration into the transnational scene. 
That impression is confirmed by the con-
spicuous presence of Chechens in the Syrian 
fighting. They have been involved in several 
spectacular and sometimes successful oper-
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 ations against government forces. They 
also appear to possess substantial military 
experience and frequently train other 
foreign fighters, including many Euro-
peans. Only their fragmentation prevents 
them from playing an even larger role. 
The Origins of Chechen Jihadism 
The jihadists in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus are considerably weakened since 
their heyday between 1995 and 2006, and 
their activities within Chechnya itself have 
dwindled since the de facto end of the 
Second Chechen War (about 2002). Their 
focus since then has shifted to neighbour-
ing republics where they regularly con-
ducted attacks, although much less fre-
quently after 2010. Since 2007 the jihadists 
in the region have been led by the Islamic 
Emirate of the Caucasus (or Imarat Kavkaz), 
but this is no more than a loose alliance 
of individual local groups (referred to as 
“jamaat” after the Arabic word for “group”). 
The strongest and most influential of the 
jamaat is the Dagestani, which has for years 
been responsible for attacks on security 
forces, judges, civil servants, non-militant 
religious scholars and supposed collabora-
tors, and represents a serious threatens to 
the republic’s internal security. Caucasian 
jihadists also occasionally conduct deadly 
headline-grabbing attacks on transport 
infrastructure (airports, railway stations, 
trains and buses) outside their home region 
in Russia proper. 
The First Chechen War of 1994–96 was 
still largely a matter of Chechen national-
ists seeking to force Russia to grant their 
republic independence. But they accepted 
the assistance of foreign (above all Arab) 
jihadists, who regarded the struggle in 
North Caucasus as part of a “holy war” 
being fought wherever Muslim territory 
was “occupied” by non-Muslims, and this 
started to internationalise their struggle. 
The end of the war saw a power struggle 
break out between the secular nationalist 
President Aslan Maskhadov and the Islam-
ists commanded by Shamil Basayev. The 
latter quickly grew in strength as Basayev 
worked closely with the foreign fighters 
who flowed into the republic from 1995, 
led by the Saudi Thamir al-Suwailim (alias 
Khattab or Ibn al-Khattab) until his death in 
2002. In the years between the two Chechen 
wars Khattab set up training camps where 
Chechens and foreign fighters trained 
together and established the first jihadist 
groups. 
When the Second Chechen War broke 
out in 1999 the Islamists placed themselves 
at the forefront of the fighting, and the 
republic attracted young jihadists from 
Arab countries, Turkey and Europe. But 
their numbers remained limited because 
prior military training was a precondition 
for joining the fight in the Caucasus. 
Despite their great professionalism the 
insurgents quickly came under pressure, 
and Khattab and numerous other leaders 
were killed. From 2002 Russian forces 
succeeded in largely cutting off the rebels’ 
supply and escape routes in the south. 
Basayev and his supporters responded with 
devastating attacks within Russia itself. One 
of the worst was the hostage-taking in the 
Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 
2002, where more than 900 hostages were 
taken and 130 died after the security forces 
pumped toxic gas into the building before 
storming it. Even more dramatic was the 
incident at a school in Beslan in North Osse-
tia in September 2004, where the insur-
gents took about 1,100 adults and children 
hostage. Three hundred of them, mostly 
children, died when Russian security forces 
stormed the building. 
By 2006 the Chechen uprising had been 
crushed and Russian forces and their local 
allies controlled the republic. But by this 
point the armed struggle had already spread 
to the neighbouring republics. Initially 
Ingushetia was most affected, but the focus 
of jihadist activity lay in Dagestan, where 
the strongest sub-group of the Emirate 
still operates today. Doku Umarov (alias 
Abu Usman) founded and led the “Islamic 
Emirate of the Caucasus” in an attempt to 
tighten coordination between independent-
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 ly operating groups in Chechnya, Dages-
tan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. 
Although his influence on the individual 
groups appears to have been limited, 
Umarov was nonetheless able to create the 
outward impression of leading a powerful 
organisation conducting attacks across the 
entire Caucasus and even in Russian cities. 
After Umarov was killed in 2013, the Emir-
ate’s leadership appointed its religious 
thinker and sharia judge, the Dagestani 
Aliaskhab Kebekov (alias Abu Muhammad), 
as his successor, but waited months before 
confirming his death in March 2014, prob-
ably because of disagreements over the 
succession. 
Chechens in the Syrian Insurgency 
Caucasians have been identifiable partici-
pants in the armed struggle against the 
Assad regime since mid-2012. Their first 
visible appearance in Aleppo in the sum-
mer of 2012 coincided with shifts in the 
structure of the Syrian rebel movement, 
whose Islamist currents strengthened 
during the course of the year. In 2012, 
jihadist groups in Syria became increas-
ingly powerful and prominent, and nu-
merous foreign fighters entered the coun-
try. The Chechens and other Caucasians, 
like their compatriots from the Arab world 
and Europe, almost without exception 
joined the jihadists. 
The Syrian insurgency has no central 
command, operating instead as a conglom-
erate of at least several dozen notable groups 
of different size and strength. Despite con-
siderable ideological and strategic differ-
ences, changing alliances and frequent 
splits, for a long time the rebels managed 
to pursue their shared objective of toppling 
Assad without serious infighting. Most esti-
mates put the total number of insurgents at 
80,000 to 100,000, including at least 8,000 
foreigners in early 2014. Others put the 
number of foreigners at up to 17,000, most 
of them Arabs. The largest non-Arab group 
is the Caucasians, who are said to number 
between several hundred and 1,500. 
The Jihadists 
The jihadists, whose strength is broadly 
estimated at 10,000 to 30,000 fighters, com-
prise only one part of the insurgency, but 
their influence has expanded since 2012. 
What sets them apart from all other insur-
gent organisations is that they treat the war 
in Syria as only the first step in a larger con-
flict that would continue after the fall of 
Assad. They aspire to establish an Islamic 
state in Syria and carry the armed struggle 
to neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq 
and Turkey, and ultimately attack Israel to 
“liberate Jerusalem”. Over and above those 
more obvious goals, many jihadists also 
explicitly want to fight the Assad regime’s 
foreign supporters, of which Russia is second 
only to Iran. This motive is especially strong 
among the Caucasian fighters and is one 
reason for their heavy presence. 
Conflict between Nusra Front and ISIS 
Although the Caucasians represent a strong 
contingent, the overwhelming majority of 
insurgents are Syrians, who are also strong-
ly represented in the jihadist groups. If they 
wish to operate in Syria, Chechens must 
therefore join Syrian organisations or work 
closely together with them. For this reason 
hostility between the Nusra Front (and other 
insurgent groups) and the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also led to polarisation 
among the Chechen groups within the 
country (see SWP Comments 19/2014). 
Fighting between the Nusra Front and 
ISIS broke out at the end of 2013 and quick-
ly affected all their main areas of opera-
tions in the north (Aleppo and Idlib), along 
the Euphrates Valley (Raqqa) and in the east 
(Deir ez-Zor). Although the Nusra Front and 
ISIS both emerged out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
their conflict is also ideological. Whereas 
the Nusra Front cooperated with non-
jihadist groups and avoided unnecessary 
violence, ISIS espoused a very much more 
radical jihadist ideology and tolerated no 
deviation from “pure” Salafi-jihadi doc-
trine. From January 2014 the Islamic Front 
(an alliance of non-jihadist Islamist and 
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 Salafist groups led by the Free Men of Syria 
[Ahrar al-Sham]) spearheaded a large-scale 
offensive that drove many ISIS units back 
to the east of the country. 
Four Chechen Organisations 
The conflict between the two leading 
jihadist currents forced the Chechens to 
choose one or other, if only because most 
of the Caucasians operated in the city and 
province of Aleppo and in Idlib, where the 
Nusra Front and ISIS were both strong. In 
summer 2013 the Caucasian forces frag-
mented into four groups of different sizes. 
One joined the Nusra Front, another ISIS. 
The other two remained independent but 
cooperated closely with the Nusra Front 
and Ahrar al-Sham. 
The Army of Emigrants and Helpers 
By far the best-known of the Chechen 
groups is the Army of Emigrants and 
Helpers (Jaish al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar), 
which joined forces with ISIS in summer 
2013. Its predecessor, called “the emi-
grants” (al-Muhajirun) or “the emigrant 
battalion” (Katibat al-Muhajirin), made its 
first public appearance in September 2012 
during fighting in Aleppo. Its leader was 
Abu Umar al-Shishani (originally Tarkhan 
Batirashvili), a member of the Chechen-
related Kist minority from the Pankisi 
Gorge in Georgia who remains to this day 
the best-known Caucasian fighter in Syria. 
Abu Umar remained the group’s leader 
when it merged with a number of smaller 
formations in March 2013 and henceforth 
operated as Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar 
(JMA or JAMWA). In the following months 
the JMA fought with several hundred men 
largely in the city and province of Aleppo, 
concentrating on capturing Syrian army 
bases. Its greatest military success was the 
capture of the Minnagh air base near Azaz 
on the Turkish border in August 2013, 
jointly with ISIS. The assault succeeded 
after the jihadists blew open one of the 
entrances with a car bomb. The Chechens 
and ISIS held the base until the end of 
February 2014. 
It was probably during the course of 
these events or in the subsequent months 
that Abu Umar al-Shishani and the JMA 
joined ISIS. Abu Umar is then reported to 
have been appointed ISIS’s emir for northern 
Syria, but without any real clarification 
of the extent of his actual authority over 
Syrian and Iraqi ISIS commanders there. 
Consequently, like all ISIS units, Abu 
Umar’s formation also came under attack 
by the Islamic Front in early 2014 and had 
to retreat eastward towards Deir ez-Zor. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the ISIS 
offensive in neighbouring Iraq in June 
2014 will affect the strength of Abu Umar’s 
contingent in Syria. There is some evidence 
– like a picture of Abu Umar in a Humvee – 
that the group acquired Iraqi army equip-
ment, which might prompt it to go on the 
offensive in Syria again. 
The JMA Split and the Islamic Emirate 
of the Caucasus 
Abu Umar’s organisation joining ISIS trig-
gered a sharp conflict among the Chechen 
fighters in Syria. Salahuddin al-Shishani, 
an important commander in Abu Umar’s 
force, left in November 2013 to lead a 
rival group that also used the name Jaish 
al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar, but with the addi-
tion of “Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus”. 
As the reason for the split, Salahuddin 
cited the incompatibility of the oath of 
loyalty to ISIS with his earlier oath to the 
Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus and its 
leader Doku Umarov. Umarov had initially 
been very sceptical about the Caucasian 
presence in Syria because he thought they 
should be fighting in their own countries. 
But in the course of spring 2013 Umarov 
accepted that his resistance was futile and 
revised his position. As a result, the Cauca-
sus Emirate websites started to celebrate 
the Caucasian contribution in Syria and 
Umarov appointed JMA commander Sala-
huddin al-Shishani to represent the Emir-
ate in Syria. In this way, Umarov and the 
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 Islamic Emirate plainly hoped to preserve 
their control over at least one section of the 
Chechen fighters in Syria. 
All that is known about Salahuddin 
al-Shishani is that like most probably all 
four leaders of the Chechen groups he is 
a Kist from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. 
He is said to command several hundred 
fighters and in early 2014 was operating 
in the villages north of Aleppo. The JMA–
Islamic Emirate cooperated closely with 
the Nusra Front in fighting against regime 
forces, but refused to join operations against 
ISIS on the grounds that they had not come 
to Syria to fight against “Muslims” (a dis-
tinction based on the ideological belief 
that all their other enemies in Syria were 
apostates or unbelievers). Nonetheless, the 
fighting between ISIS and its insurgent 
rivals caused great uncertainty within the 
JMA. A number of reports suggest that some 
of its members broke away in 2014 to join 
Abu Umar’s group in ISIS. 
The Saifullah Group in the Nusra Front 
The second split from Abu Umar’s JMA 
was the group led by Saifullah al-Shishani 
(originally Ruslan Machalikashvili), which 
joined forces with the Nusra Front at the 
end of 2013. 
Saifullah, also a Kist, left the Pankisi 
Gorge and Georgia for Turkey in 2001 or 
2002. He is reported to have been involved 
in criminal activities in both countries. 
After arriving in Syria in late 2012 or early 
2013 he joined Abu Umar’s Muhajirin, 
where he quickly moved through the ranks 
of the organization to become Umar’s right 
hand man, as reflected by his prominence 
in JMA videos. 
In July/August 2013 Saifullah fell out 
with Abu Umar and left the JMA with 
several dozen followers. The main reason 
for the conflict was a power struggle 
between the two ambitious leaders, but 
Saifullah is also said to have protested 
against the extreme brutality of the new 
ally ISIS. Saifullah appears to have pulled 
back westwards from the Aleppo area 
towards the Turkish border, where in the 
following months he operated jointly with 
the fourth Chechen group, the Soldiers 
of Syria (Junud al-Sham). In November or 
December 2013 Saifullah swore allegiance 
to the Nusra Front, but without renouncing 
his close cooperation with Junud al-Sham. 
On 6 February 2014, an attempt by the 
Islamic Front, the Nusra Front and their two 
allied Chechen groups to storm Aleppo’s 
central prison was repulsed by government 
forces. Saifullah was killed in the fighting. 
In February 2014 his successor Mohammed 
Khorasani confirmed the group’s allegiance 
to the Nusra Front. 
The Soldiers of Syria (Junud al-Sham) 
Junud al-Sham is the only Chechen group 
that has been able to maintain its inde-
pendence, despite frequently cooperating 
with Nusra and the Islamic Front. It owes 
its reputation largely to its leader Muslim 
Abu Walid (originally Muslim Margoshvili). 
Muslim Abu Walid stands out among 
Chechen commanders because he served as 
a leader under the legendary jihadist field 
commander Khattab in the Second Chechen 
War in the early 2000s. That he is not the 
uncontested leader of the Syrian Chechens 
despite that record could be connected to 
his spell in prison in Russia between 2003 
and 2005. His unusually quick release awak-
ened suspicions in jihadist circles that he 
might have done a deal with the authori-
ties. While that cannot be ruled out, he sub-
sequently rejoined the jihadists fighting in 
Dagestan. 
Muslim always wanted to operate in 
the North Caucasus, and from 2009 made 
repeated efforts to find a way from Georgia 
to Chechnya. Only after all his efforts failed 
did he decide to go to Syria after the upris-
ing began there. Junud al-Sham’s headquar-
ters and area of operations are in the north 
of the coastal province of Latakia, in the 
mountains near the Turkish border. In 
August 2013 the group joined an offensive 
against Alawi villages in the coastal moun-
tains, but their assault was repulsed. In 
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 spring 2014 the insurgents made another 
attempt to penetrate the Alawi heartland 
and reach the coast – operating from Turk-
ish territory according to press reports. In 
the interim Muslim and his fighters were 
also frequently in Aleppo and its northern 
surroundings, where Junud al-Sham took 
part in the early February assault on the 
prison in Aleppo. 
Junud al-Sham is not a large group, with 
the number of fighters probably not exceed-
ing the low hundreds. But there is evidence 
that they – like the other Chechens – are 
especially well-trained. The Chechens (and 
Uzbeks) enjoy a well-deserved reputation as 
the elite forces of the jihadist movement, 
because their first generation served in the 
Red Army and their fighters can draw on 
long experience in guerrilla warfare. 
A European Problem 
The Chechens in Syria represent a domes-
tic security problem in Europe and Turkey, 
because many of the fighters in the four 
groups originate from the diaspora. Con-
siderable numbers of those now in Syria 
come from Georgia and Turkey, but there 
are also dozens from Austria and France 
and rather fewer from Belgium, Scandina-
via and Germany. 
The numbers of Chechens in Europe 
have grown substantially in recent years, in 
particular in the aftermath of the Chechen 
wars. In certain countries these diaspora 
communities represent important recruit-
ment pools for jihadist groups. The biggest 
problem appears to exist in Austria, as more 
than half of the about 100 fighters from 
that country in Syria are Chechen in origin. 
From France about 80 young Caucasian 
men are reported to have travelled to Syria, 
while the figures for Belgium and Scandi-
navia appear to be smaller. In Germany 
only isolated cases have been reported to 
date, but the true figure could be higher 
given that the Chechen jihadist scene in 
Berlin is substantial and high-profile. Because 
the volunteers join highly trained Cauca-
sian groups in Syria, it must be assumed 
that – if they survive – they will return with 
profound knowledge of guerrilla warfare 
and terrorist methods. Theoretically this 
poses the greatest danger to Russia, because 
“liberating” the Caucasus from Russian rule 
is the uppermost objective for all Caucasian 
fighters. But since 2002 the Russian Federa-
tion has been very successful in restricting 
the influx of foreign fighters back home to 
the Caucasus or elsewhere in its territory. 
So it must be feared that most returnees 
will travel to Turkey and their European 
countries of residence. 
The Syrian conflict also appears to be 
leading the Caucasians to establish new 
and closer transnational contacts, as the 
Arab fighters in Afghanistan did in the 
1980s. There are numerous indications 
that the Chechen groups in Syria are train-
ing other foreigners, including Germans 
of different ethnic origins. The latter are 
following a long tradition of sympathy for 
Chechnya among German jihadists. Mo-
hammed Atta’s Hamburg cell that supplied 
three of the four pilots for the 9/11 attacks 
in 2001 initially intended to go and fight 
in Chechnya rather than join al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan. The multicultural centre in 
Neu-Ulm, some of whose users went to fight 
in the Caucasus, became the institutional 
centre of enthusiasm for the Chechen cause 
in Germany. Two members of the Sauerland 
group jailed for a plot to attack the US air-
base at Ramstein originated from this milieu. 
They initially attempted to go to Chechnya, 
gave up because they lacked the necessary 
military training, instead travelled to Paki-
stan and later attempted to carry out an 
attack in Germany. 
This longstanding tradition continues 
to this day. The first indication of close 
contacts between German jihadists and 
Chechens in Syria was supplied by Denis 
Cuspert, a rapper from Berlin who convert-
ed to Islam and travelled to Syria to join the 
insurgency. In December 2012 he released 
a video containing a jihad hymn (nasheed) 
entitled “Chichan” (Chechnya), describing 
the Chechen jihadists as models to be sup-
ported. At this point he may already have 
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 been in contact with Junud al-Sham in 
Syria, with whom he probably trained. 
It is still not properly clear what new 
alliances are being forged in Syria, but the 
historical parallels to Afghanistan are un-
mistakable. There, in the 1980s, far from 
home, Arabs from across the Middle East 
met and established the transnational ties 
that ultimately led to the emergence of 
al-Qaeda. In Syria a similar process is under 
way, but this time there are about two 
thousand Europeans and hundreds of Turks 
among the foreign fighters. 
Counter-measures 
When it comes to countering the Chechen 
jihadists, the same issues apply as for the 
European jihadists: without the full cooper-
ation of the Turkish political leadership 
and security authorities it will be difficult 
for Europe to protect itself from the poten-
tial danger. But in a throwback to its past 
policy in the Chechen conflict, Turkey 
tolerates the activities of Islamist terrorists 
on its territory. In the 1990s and early 2000s 
it turned a blind eye to foreign fighters 
moving through its territory to the Cauca-
sus and failed to respond when several 
hundred Turks joined the fighting against 
the Russians. Although Ankara renounced 
that policy in 2004/2005, it is doing the 
same again today with respect to Syria. 
Chechen groups use Turkey as a rear base 
and receive support from the Chechen 
diaspora there without state interference. 
The Turkish government apparently believes 
it can instrumentalise jihadist groups for 
its own purposes, such as toppling Assad 
and suppressing Syrian Kurdish currents 
close to the PKK. 
Ankara’s support for Chechen and other 
foreign jihadists, despite clear warnings 
from its European partners, endangers 
internal security within Turkey itself and 
in Europe. Germany and Europe must 
therefore work to convince the Turkish 
political leadership to refrain from aiding 
terrorist organisations and to improve co-
operation with European partners. 
More broadly, European governments 
and security agencies must prepare for the 
dangers presented by the Chechen groups 
in Syria and their European friends. The 
Chechen diaspora is still a largely unknown 
phenomenon in Europe and the fragmen-
tation of the groups in Syria makes it still 
harder to adequately assess the threat. In 
order to identify possible dangers at an 
early stage, for example, speakers of the 
numerous and difficult Caucasian lan-
guages must be recruited. That may sound 
a banal recommendation, but it is key when 
one considers the problems European secu-
rity agencies (and armed forces) experience 
with much more widely spoken languages 
like Uzbek, Pashto and Urdu. A more effec-
tive sharing of tasks within Europe would 
be pertinent. 
Difficult decisions will also have to be 
made about which governments, police 
forces and intelligence services to seek 
cooperation with, and to what extent. In 
the first place this means Russia, whose 
agencies have always been awkward part-
ners but are the only ones with long experi-
ence in combating Caucasian militancy. 
Indeed, while not attempting to offer an 
excuse for its unscrupulous Syria policy, 
Moscow was undeniably aware of the 
emerging problem in Syria much earlier 
than Western governments. Therefore, 
while it would be remiss to exclude all and 
any cooperation with Moscow, the bounds 
should be tightly drawn. On the other hand, 
there must be no cooperation with the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad, however long 
he may survive. If Europe wishes to retain 
a last shred of credibility on Syria, after all 
that has happened during the past three 
years, overtures to Damascus are out of the 
question. 
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